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Misguided Men: International Law and the Closing of Guantanamo  
Michael Tonn 
Dr. David Kinsella, Faculty Mentor 
Abstract 
With the signing of the Executive Order to close Guantanamo Bay, the need for research has 
arisen to address the possible solutions. A framework of analysis, built upon various legal 
factors, is needed to formulate acceptable legal options that coincide with political goals. The 
difficulty lies in the moral and ethical willingness to pursue these ends. However, only by 
adhering to the rule of law can the US government effectively close the detention center at 
Guantanamo and also implement a plan to deal with future incidents regarding possible terrorist 
suspects.  
Introduction 
Closing the detention center at Guantanamo Bay is a complex, intricate, and important problem 
facing the US government today. Much has already been written discussing treatment of the 
detainees, evidence regarding the detainees gained from interrogation, and the difference 
between torture and degrading treatment. Key issues of debate among scholars have been the 
limits of presidential power1 and the need for balance between the three branches of 
government.2 While these issues are of upmost importance, they are not the main focus of this 
paper. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the current condition facing the Obama 
Administration as it searches for solutions on how to properly release the detainees held at 
Guantanamo Bay. Past conditions will be addressed to construct a framework of analysis and 
thus making an informed policy recommendation.  
This analysis will begin by considering context provided by the “War on Terror.” The strategic 
logic employed by the Bush Administration will be discussed to draw attention specifically to the 
detainees’ legal status. This legal status will then be compared to provisions of international law. 
                                                     
1 Joseph Marguiles. Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.  
2 Benjamin Wittes. Law and the Long War. New York: Penguin Press, 2008. 
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Turning back to domestic policies, a review of policy actions and reactions will show how the 
separate branches of the US government addressed the concerns of national security and 
international law. Lastly, by analyzing the commission process, a legal solution is recommended 
that acts in concurrence with both domestic and international law.  
Context of “War on Terror” 
In the week following the attacks of Sept. 11th, Congress authorized the President to use force in 
what would become the “War on Terror.” The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
states quite well the range of actions available to the President. As Section 2 (a) states: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons. 
Osama bin Laden was soon named public enemy number one along with the al-Qaeda network. 
The connection between the Taliban government of Afghanistan and bin Laden, who had been 
allowed to run terrorist training camps within the Afghan countryside, was established by US 
intelligence. Quickly, the US military was mobilized to invade Afghanistan and overthrow the 
government, in accordance with the AUMF of Sept. 18th, 2001. Even though customarily 
forbidden by international law3, Congress made no objection to the President instructing the US 
military to overthrow a foreign government. The political atmosphere following Sept. 11th, both 
                                                     
3 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 2 
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domestically and internationally, was filled with claims of solidarity, knowledge of the new 
threat, and calls of action ranging from justice to revenge. 
 In this frenzied environment of political and military activity, operations were begun in 
Afghanistan with little regard to international customs of war. Parts of Afghanistan were carpet 
bombed, even though they contained civilians, including women and children4. Pamphlets were 
distributed promising “wealth and power” to anyone who turned over al-Qaeda suspects5. Those 
captured or handed over to the US military were shipped to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. 
Bagram became the jump off point for interrogations and for some, the first step towards 
indefinite detainment at Guantanamo.  
Bush Administration Strategic Logic 
Following the recommendation contained in a memo sent by Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
John Yoo and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin to Department of Defense 
General Counsel William Haynes II in December 2001, men began to arrive at Guantanamo.6 As 
part of the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, Yoo and Philbin maintained that if the 
detainees were held at Guantanamo, they could be denied access to the US legal system. The 
Naval base was assigned to US jurisdiction and control as part of 1903 treaty agreement with 
Cuba. While the Cuban government still retains ultimate sovereignty over the land itself, the US 
has complete jurisdiction and control over the base.  
                                                     
4 Moazzam Begg, Enemy Combatant (New York: The New Press, 2006), 100-101. 
5 Mark Denbeaux, “Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department 
of Defense Data,” Seton Hall University School of Law, February 2006, 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf. 
6 Patrick Philbin and John Yoo, “Memo for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense.” In The 
Torture Papers, edited by Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 29.  
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The Bush Administration needed a place to further interrogate men captured in the war in 
Afghanistan. They justified the detention center at Guantanamo by exploiting the difference 
between sovereignty and jurisdiction. The Office of Legal Counsel claimed that by holding them 
on foreign land, the detainees would not have access to the American court system and could be 
held indefinitely or until the War on Terror concluded. Using this justification created a “legal 
black hole” as British Lord Steyn described it.7 The detainees could not seek due legal process in 
American courts or any court system initially. Given the amorphous character of the War on 
Terror, detainees could be held indefinitely by claiming that they would return to the field of 
battle to plot more terrorist attacks and kill more Americans. 
On January 9, 2002, Yoo and Special Counsel Robert Delabunty produced another memo 
concluding that international treaties and federal laws do not apply to members of al Qaeda or 
the Taliban.8 In this memo, the authors state that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are not nation-states 
and therefore, the Geneva Conventions do not apply. Also, the War Crimes Act, Title 18 U.S. 
Code 2441, does not apply for the same basic reason. But even more disturbing is that the 
authors of the memo concluded that “customary international law, whatever its source and 
content, does not bind the President, or restrict the actions of the US military, because it does not 
constitute federal law recognized under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.”9 
Within this legal black hole came a new legal definition by the Bush Administration- “unlawful 
enemy combatant.” Both of these adjectives have been used in place of each other to denote the 
same detainee’s status- either “enemy combatant” or “unlawful combatant.”  
                                                     
7 Lord Johan Steyn, “Guantanamo Bay: The legal black hole,” Statewatch News, 25 November 2003, 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/Guantanamo.pdf 
8 Greenberg et al., Torture Papers, 38. 
9 Ibid., 39.  
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Although used as an official status, the definition of an unlawful enemy combatant was not 
codified until the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006. According to the MCA, an 
“unlawful enemy combatant” is a person who: 
(1) “has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported 
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful 
enemy combatant,” or (2) “has been determined to be an unlawful enemy 
combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) or another 
competent tribunal” by a certain date.10 
 
While it echoes similar language contained in the AUMF, this definition contains a discrepancy 
when put into practice. To determine an “unlawful enemy combatant”, many CSRT’s relied on 
faulty information gleaned through harsh interrogation techniques, unreliable sources, or plain 
nonsense. For example, according to a report by Seton Hall law professor Mark Denbeaux, some 
CSRT decisions where based upon the detainee using a guest house (a common sleeping 
arrangement in the country of Afghanistan), wearing olive drab clothing, or possessing a Casio 
watch.11 Too often, CRSTs based their determinations upon the recommendations already 
contained in the detainee’s files, most of which came from interrogators. It’s crucial to point out 
the circular reasoning here: men were determined to be “unlawful enemy combatants” because 
someone had claimed them to be “unlawful enemy combatants.” Then, using this determination 
as a legal status, these men were prohibited from seeking redress through US courts on the basis 
of habeas corpus, a universal right of international law, domestic law and common law.  
                                                     
10 Michael Garcia, et al, Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues, Congressional Research Service 
Report R40139, Jan 22, 2009, 16. 
11 Denbeaux, Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile, 17. 
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The Bush Administration was looking to glean vital intelligence from these captured men but the 
only way they could have detained and interrogated them was by denying them habeas corpus 
through this new definition of “unlawful enemy combatant.” Prisoners of war are normally given 
protection against unending questioning by Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention: “Every 
prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names 
and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, 
equivalent information.” If given POW status, the detainees could no longer be subjected to 
endless interrogations, thus jeopardizing their usefulness to intelligence officials.  
International Law 
By deeming these men “enemy combatants” the Bush administration tried to justify their 
indefinite detainment by denying them status as prisoners of war. Article 4 of the Third Geneva 
Convention gives various criteria in regards to status as a prisoner of war. A person must belong 
to one of the following categories: 
A. Be a member of the armed forces of a party in conflict 
B. Be a member of a militia belonging to a party in conflict and fulfill the following: 
1. Must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.  
2. Wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.  
3. Carry arms openly.  
4. Conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
C. Be a member of an armed force that professes allegiance with a government or 
authority not recognized by the detaining power.  
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Delineation must be made between the Taliban and al-Qaeda with regards to these criteria. 
Members of the Taliban could fall under either criterion A or C. The Taliban was the ruling 
government and also the armed forces of the country of Afghanistan, which is a signatory of the 
Geneva Conventions thus fulfilling criterion A. Or, the Afghani armed forces professed 
allegiance to the Taliban government which is not recognized by the detaining power (i.e. the 
US), thus fulfilling criterion C.  
Now, consider these criteria in regards to al-Qaeda, with criterion B being the essential 
condition. The first conditional could be argued to exist. The hierarchy structure of al-Qaeda is 
not under the command of true military commanders, but de facto leaders. As for a fixed sign, al-
Qaeda carries no emblems, no flags, or insignia traditionally associated with military forces. 
However, they have been known to carry arms openly. As for the last condition, terrorists 
intentionally obscure the laws of war to conduct their operations. By avoiding the laws and 
customs of war, they can achieve their political goals through dramatic means. A definition of 
terrorism would be beneficial at this point. As Resolution 1566 of the United Nation states, 
terrorism is:  
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or 
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror 
in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a 
population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain 
from doing any act. 
Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network definitely fit the definition of a terrorist. Most of the 
detainees do not. However, they drew no distinction between those captured and those actually 
8 | P a g e  
 
confirmed to be members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban or otherwise. Therefore, the Bush 
administration denied all the detainees’ status as prisoners of war, as the memo from Alberto 
Gonzales to the President, dated January 25, 2002, clearly indicates in which Gonzales provides 
the legal justification for such a decision.12 The Geneva Conventions makes it clear that anyone 
captured during armed hostilities is considered a prisoner of war and afforded protection under 
the Third Convention until deemed otherwise by competent tribunal, under Article 5.  
Even though the Bush Administration maintained that the CSRT fit this necessity, using the 
word “tribunals” in this case is an equivocation: Article 5 tribunals are to establish status as 
POW’s, if such doubt exists. CSRT’s determine status as enemy combatants. The Bush 
Administration had already maintained that the detainees were not POW’s, so the CSRT’s are 
unable to replace or replicate the Article 5 tribunals. Unless used to grant POW status, CSRT’s 
do not qualify as Article 5 tribunals. 
Even if detainees were deemed not to be POW’s they were still afforded protections under the 
Fourth Geneva Convention as Civilian Persons in Time of War. Everyone during a time of war is 
afforded protection by either the Third or the Fourth Convention; there is no lack of legal 
coverage. A person captured is given status as a POW and given protection under the Third 
Convention or they are considered a civilian and given protection under the Fourth Convention. 
However, the Bush Administration found a clever strategy: they made a new category of “enemy 
combatant,” labeled whomever they wanted, and placed these individuals outside the protections 
of the Third and Fourth Conventions. But as the United Nations stated in a report on the situation 
                                                     
12 Greenberg et al., Torture Papers, 118. 
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of the detainees, ‘the ongoing detention of the Guantanamo Bay detainees as “enemy 
combatants” does in fact constitute arbitrary deprivation of the right to personal liberty.’13 
Action/Reaction 
The Supreme Court and Congress had been doing a legal dance the entire time. The first step was 
the decision of Rasul v. Bush where the legality of the detainment was first broached. However, 
this case was not to determine whether the indefinite detainment was legal but whether the US 
courts actually had the jurisdiction to hear the prisoners’ cases. The decision in Rasul was merely 
to determine if the men held at Guantanamo could pursue habeas corpus through US courts. The 
dissenting judges stressed the point that America should not extend any protections to prisoners 
held under Department of Defense custody, citing the case of Johnson v. Eisentrager. 
Eisentrager involved German nationals captured in China and tried in the American-occupied 
section of Germany. The distinction in this case is that the Guantanamo detainees are under 
American civil jurisdiction from the terms of the original lease with Cuba while the respondents 
in Eisentrager were never within territorial jurisdiction of the American civil system.  
Congress reacted by signing into law the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). The DTA set 
up the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) and the Administrative Review Boards 
(ARB). CSRT’s weigh available evidence to determine a combatant’s status is lawful or not. The 
ARB’s act much like parole boards, to determine whether the DOD should continue holding 
these men. The DTA also states that “no federal court, justice or judge shall have jurisdiction to 
                                                     
13 UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, February 15, 2006. 
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hear or consider the application for the writ of habeas corpus filed by or on the behalf of an alien 
detained by the DOD at Guantanamo”.14  
In 2006, the Supreme Court stepped forward with the decision of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Hamdan 
petitioned that the neither congressional act nor law of war supports trial by commission for 
conspiracy, and that the procedures adopted to try him violate basic tenets of military and 
international law, including the principle that a defendant must be permitted to see and hear the 
evidence against him.15 The District of Columbia Circuit court dismissed Hamdan’s challenge on 
the grounds that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable and that, in any event, 
Hamdan is not entitled to their protections. The Supreme Court ruled that neither of these 
grounds is persuasive.16 
Congress made another concerted side step with the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006. 
The legislature returned to the notion that the detainees should be placed outside the protection 
of the Geneva Conventions. Section 948b of the MCA states: “No unlawful enemy combatant 
subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as 
a source of rights.” Here we have the highest law making body of the United States stating that 
they want to deny the universal human rights protection of the Geneva Conventions, afforded to 
all people of the world. According to Article 3 of Fourth Geneva Convention, the following are 
prohibited at all times and apply to those not taking part in hostilities, including those who have 
laid down their arms: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture  
                                                     
14 DTA Section 1004(a). 
15 Hamdan, 548 U.S. 05-184 (2006), 2. 
16 Hamdan, 62-63. 
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(b) taking of hostages 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment  
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
Perhaps it was political pressure not to give alleged terrorists any safe haven, even under law, or 
perhaps it was pressure from the Bush Administration to keep these men held there indefinitely. 
 Again we find the similar limited jurisdiction found in the DTA, which amends Section 2241 of 
Title 28 of the US code: “No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf on an alien detained by the United 
States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy 
combatant or is awaiting such determination” (emphasis mine).17 Not only has Congress 
authorized the President to indefinitely hold anyone, but even those that are not yet deemed to be 
“enemy combatants”.18 
Consider the cases of Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, both of which were US citizens. Padilla was 
arrested in Chicago and held as an enemy combatant in a military brig in North Carolina. Hamdi 
                                                     
17 MCA Section 7(a).  
18 This is what happened to Brandon Mayfield of Portland, OR. In Steven Wax’s book Kafka Comes to America, 
(New York: Other Press, 2008) he gives a vivid description of his defense of Mr. Mayfield as federal public 
defender. Brandon had been, for all intents and purposes, ‘detained’ by the FBI during an investigation that pointed 
to Mr. Mayfield being an accomplice to the bombings in Madrid in 2004. The FBI did not present a warrant to 
Brandon when they took him from his private practice law office. Their investigation rested upon a fingerprint they 
had received from the Madrid police that matched Brandon’s. It was later found out that the fingerprint was not his, 
the obvious revelation being that Spanish police arrested the real suspect.  
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was captured in Afghanistan, sent to Guantanamo, but then transferred to the same military brig 
once his American citizenship was discovered. Not only were these men denied their 
international human rights but also their rights as citizens of the United States because of being 
labeled “enemy combatants.” 
Once again, the Supreme Court answered with another decisive step in 2008. In Boumediene v. 
Bush, the Court ruled that the MCA “operates an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus”.19 It was argued that there were courts with applicable ability and jurisdiction to 
try the detainees and the military commissions were therefore unneeded. The Suspension Clause 
of the Constitution allows only Congress, and not the President, to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus for the security of the United States in extreme circumstances. The judges also argued 
that with a fully functional court system, Congress was not authorized to suspend the writ for 
anyone, especially those held under detention by the Department of Defense. Once again, the 
Executive branch was treating the detainees as military personnel for prosecution purposes (to 
secure trial by military commission and to avoid the Judicial branch) and then also denying them 
status as military personnel (to escape the protections of the Third Geneva Convention).  
The commissions lack due process in many crucial regards. Detainees are required to be assigned 
military counsel and cannot waive this right, effectively limiting their ability to act as their own 
counsel.20They can also be denied notification of the charges against them, an essential element 
of habeas corpus, due to national security concerns.21 If told of their charges, detainees were 
thought to be able to notify operatives either inside or outside the prison of sensitive information 
in the making, and thus sparking more terrorist attacks. For the same reason, it was accepted that 
                                                     
19 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 06-1195 (2008), 6.  
20 Clive Stafford Smith, Eight O’clock Ferry to the Windward Side: Seeking Justice in Guantanamo Bay, (New 
York: Nation Books, 2007), 88 and 111.  
21 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Subchapter IV, Section 949d.  
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detainees were not required to actually be present for their trial. In fact, they could be removed if 
it was thought they were creating any kind of disturbance.22 However, a compromise was 
reached in which their counsel would be notified of all charges, but, of course, counsel could not 
actually discuss the charges with the detainee, limiting their ability to build a case and provide a 
thorough defense. Additionally, given the classified nature of some information, only lawyers 
able to secure a top secret clearance were be able to represent the men at Guantanamo. Anything 
discussed between the detainee and counsel was subject to the military censor’s review, violating 
attorney-client privilege, although it was claimed to be for strictly security purposes.23 Counsel 
could not notify detainees of current world events that might have contributed to their case, also 
due to security concerns.24 The military commission process effectively placed lawyers and 
detainees incommunicado, with the military as the mediator of anything that could be said. 
Additionally, the court of last resort is also placed within the military- meaning, the Commander 
in Chief, or someone from the Department of Defense he so designates.25 This means that all 
detainee appeals would eventually reach the President, the very official calling for their 
detainment, which clearly violates the impartially factor required by a court of law.  
Detainees have also been unable to provide for their own defense by being denied the ability to 
contact key witnesses. Most of these men are poor and come from very rural parts of countries 
thousands of miles away from Guantanamo. At Guantanamo, it is ludicrous to think that 
providing legal processes in legislation is the same as providing them in reality.  
                                                     
22 Ibid. 
23 Smith, Eight O’clock Ferry, 132. 
24 Ibid., 135. 
25 Leonard Cutler, “Human Rights Guarantees, Constitutional Law, and the Military Commissions Act of 
2006,”Peace & Change, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 2008), 35. 
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Boumediene also challenged the CSRT’s by pointing out that detainee’s have limited means to 
find or present evidence to challenge the Government’s case, do not have assistance to counsel, 
and may not be aware of the most critical allegations that the Government has relied upon to 
order their detention. However, once a prisoner is labeled an ‘enemy combatant’ by the CSRT, 
he is then forced to convince them of his innocence. These men were considered guilty until 
proven innocent.  
Current Situation 
Of the approximately 800 men that have been detained as “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo, 
approximately 200 remain. With 200 dangerous, slightly dangerous or innocent men grouped 
together for release, the Obama Administration is faced with cleaning up a difficult situation 
within a self-imposed time frame of one year, commencing January 22, 2009.  
Now that the executive order has been signed, what is to be done with the remaining 200 men 
that currently occupy Guantanamo? How should the dangerous detainees be tried? And, what 
kind of precedent is this setting? 
The men fall into three categories. 
First, there are the ones who have no ties to terrorist organizations. They have been held there 
arbitrarily and are awaiting release. However, finding them a home is the problem. Many come 
from countries that been known to violate human rights and returning these men to such 
countries would be a practice incongruent with international law. These men also carry the 
stigma of being detained at Guantanamo. Many countries are afraid to take these men because 
they have been labeled terrorists.  
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Second, there are the hard-line terrorists that deserve to be imprisoned for the crimes they have 
committed and readily admit. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is such an example.  
For the third grouping, the line becomes hazier. There are men who have spent time alongside al-
Qaeda, often as support, such as drivers and suppliers. These men are dangerous enough to 
prosecute but it will be difficult to conduct a fair trial if the only evidence brought forth is 
hearsay evidence obtained though US intelligence or interrogation.  
In a Congressional Research Service Report dated Jan 22, 2009, a three part solution was 
proposed: 26 
1. Release those with no terrorist ties 
2. Trial by commissions 
3. Trial in civilian courts 
Option number one has worked rather slowly for the innocent at Guantanamo. Nations around 
the world have been reluctant to take in these men. Bermuda took 4. France and Ireland have 
each taken one. The tiny Pacific island nation of Palau has taken 17 of the Uighurs, a group of 
Muslims from the southwestern Chinese Province of Xinjiang that are labeled as terrorists by the 
People’s Party of China. The Chinese had been expecting extradition but the US refused to send 
them there based upon Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture which prohibits sending 
prisoners to countries where it would be reasonable to assume that they would be tortured. This 
process is ongoing and depends much on the political savvy of diplomats and the willingness of 
foreign nationals to trust the reports of US intelligence asserting the detainees’ innocence.  
                                                     
26 Michael Garcia, et al, Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center. 
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Option three has been utilized in the trial of Ahmed Ghaliani, a suspect in the bombings of the 
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in the US District court located in New York City.  
As for option two, the Obama Administration has expressed that the military commissions will 
be revived to try the detainees, albeit with greater legal protections. In a news story from May 
16, 2009, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs stated that the new commissions will no longer 
use statements obtained by cruel, inhumane and degrading interrogations methods as evidence. 
Hearsay will also be limited, removing the burden of proof from the party who objects to its 
reliability. The accused will also have greater latitude in selecting their counsel. Additionally, 
basic protections will be provided for those who refuse to testify and the military commission 
judges may establish the jurisdiction of their own courts. These renovations of the commission 
process still seem to be at ends with the decision of Boumediene v. Bush. It was ruled that the 
commissions set up by the MCA were unconstitutional but now the Executive is again 
authorizing their continuation regardless, albeit with new rules. Some are calling this a step in 
the wrong direction. The military defender for Salim Hamdan, Lt. Colonel Brian Mizer, called 
them “disappointing.” 27  
Tracy Schmaler, a Justice Department spokeswoman, said in a statement: “The administration is 
working on a legal framework that will restore military commissions as a legitimate forum for 
prosecutions in line with the rule of law. Under the previous administration, only three detainees 
were successfully prosecuted in over seven years. Meanwhile, federal courts have ordered some 
                                                     
27 Reported by Kim Landers, Obama Revives Guantanamo Bay Military Commissions, radio, ABC News, May 16th, 
2009, found at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2008/s2572376.htm 
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detainees released and declared the flawed judicial system established to prosecute these 
detainees unconstitutional.”28 
Exactly how the commissions can be changed to be both constitutional and effective in the face 
of the same legal obstacles that were faced previously is unclear. If the statements obtained 
through torture are thrown out, hearsay is limited, the accused select their own counsel, and other 
basic protections are provided, then the commission process effectively becomes equal to that of 
a civilian court. Once again, the commissions are no longer needed and thus, unconstitutional.  
End in Sight? 
On May 5th, 2009, the Obama Administration was dealt a significant blow when the Democratic 
Congress refused to appropriate funds for the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility.29 The 
proponents of the funding freeze lambasted the President for not providing a clear plan for the 
money. They were not ready to give the President a blank check regarding the closure of the 
facility, yet years prior many of these same men felt it necessary to give President Bush a blank 
check to detainee these men for the sake of American security. As the Associated Press reported 
on May 21st, 2009, a bipartisan contingency voted 90-6 to keep the prison open and forbid the 
transfer of detainees to facilities in the US.30 
Time and again, American politicians have expressed their dissatisfaction with the Obama 
Administration’s handling of the closure. Some have criticized the President for not having a 
                                                     
28 David Johnston, “New Guidance Issued on Military Trials of Detainees,” The New York Times (New 
York, New York), June 29, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/us/29gitmo.html?ref=global-home  
29 Megan Scully and Humberto Sanchez, “Obey Rejects Obama’s Request For Funds to Shutter Guantanamo 
Detention Center,” NationalJournel.com, May 5, 2009, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/cda_20090505_9844.php. 
30 Associated Press, “Inouye measure to keep Guantanamo open wins OK,” Star Bulletin (Honolulu, HI), May 21, 
2009,  “http://www.starbulletin.com/news/20090521_inouye_measure_to_keep_guantanamo_open_wins_ok.html 
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strategy in place once he signed the executive order.31 They have also stressed to their 
constituents that President Obama wants to free terrorists onto American streets.32  
Policy Recommendations 
Perched precariously between politically acceptable options and the rule of law, the solution to 
the closing of Guantanamo consists of three crucial elements based upon timeframes. 
The first element to address is the past. The main recommendation here is to ban the inherited 
faulty military commissions. It would be disastrous to Obama’s human rights legacy to continue 
with the “ad hoc” legal system he condemned in his speech before the National Archives on May 
21st, 2009. 33The very nature of the commissions stands in direct opposition to basic elements of 
due legal process, as was described above. Overcoming the unfair aspects of the military 
commission effectively renders them moot. As has been shown with the federal trial of Ghaliani, 
prosecution in US civilian courts is acceptable on a political front, and adheres to the rule of law.  
The second element to address is the present. While it has been slow going, the Obama 
Administration is making small strides to resolve the release of innocent detainees to other 
countries. However, there still looms the possibility that some men will not be accepted by 
foreign governments, in which case the responsibility for their care will remain with the US. This 
predicament would most likely offend the political sensitivities of many American citizens and 
                                                     
31David M. Herszenhorn, “Senate G.O.P Leader Warns Against Closing Gitmo,” The New York Times, April 21, 
2009, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/21/senate-gop-leader-warns-against-closing-gitmo/ 
32 Congressman Louie Gohmert, “Keep Guantanamo Open, Mr. President,” Pajamas Media, May 22, 
2009, http://gohmert.house.gov/?sectionid=44&sectiontree=4,44&itemid=582. 
33Primary source, “Obama on National Security and American Values,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2009, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/05/21/obama_on_national_security_and.html. 
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government officials, even though their judgment is passed primarily upon stigma, rather than 
true legal determination. The label of “Guantanamo detainee” is one that is not easily erased, 
regardless of whether the label “innocent” is attached as well. Additionally, there is legislation 
being pursued to ban the transfer of detainees to the US.  
Perhaps the next best solution would be to return every detainee to their country of citizenry, 
regardless of circumstances. While a politically viable option in some cases, this could result in a 
blow to the rule of law, as international law forbids repatriation to countries under the reasonable 
assumption that one will be tortured. Either way, the Obama Administration needs to continue 
pursuing its present course of action for releasing the innocent detainees: using diplomacy, 
reaching out to foreign governments, and making compromises.  
The third element to address is the future. The US will need to imprison those they try and 
convict in federal courts. It is very unlikely that any foreign government will accept these men. 
The city council of Hardin, Montana passed a resolution to accept detainees into the Two Rivers 
Detention Facility located there.34 While immediately opposed by Montana’s congressional 
members, this kind of solution is still present. Perhaps, it will take some federal handouts and 
promises that have come to be part of the Guantanamo closing solution.35 The legislation 
forbidding transfer of detainees will need to be vetoed as well. While politically unacceptable to 
some, this option is already a necessity being brought about with the federal trial of Ghaliani. 
Turning a US-convicted terrorist over to another country for imprisonment seems ironic and 
lacking in justification.  
                                                     
34 Pat Dawson, “Postcard: Hardin,” TIME magazine, May 18, 2009, 6. 
35 Palau has been promised $200 million in support for accepting the 17 Uighurs.  
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Another aspect of the future that needs to be addressed will be the precedent set by the trial of 
suspected terrorists in federal courts. Not all aspects of seeking a conviction in matters of 
national security lend themselves well to the civilian court process- namely the occasional need 
to rely on hearsay evidence and classified information for prosecution. A plan needs to be 
formulated to address these concerns. As has been suggested by some scholars, a national 
security court could be implemented. 36 More than a federal court system, but not quite a military 
commission, the national security court could use hearsay evidence on a case by case basis. The 
use of classified information will still need to be reconciled. The main advantage of a national 
security court would be to conduct trial proceedings in an impartial civilian setting, outside the 
‘command influence’ that is characteristic of the military commissions. Perhaps both civilian and 
military judges could preside together as a panel.  
There is the need for stronger legislation outlining exactly what kind of legal process is 
necessary to try and convict future terrorists that attack the United States. As we have seen with 
the Bush Administration, inventing new legal processes while currently facing a situation can 
produce unwanted results. The time is now to address the prosecution of terrorists domestically, 
consistent with both US and international law.  
Conclusion 
Although closing the detention center at Guantanamo Bay is a complex and critical problem, it is 
not without possible solutions. The current situation facing the Obama Administration has been 
borne out of the Bush Administration’s strategic logic, the push-pull between the three branches 
                                                     
36 Nicholas Kittrie, “The International Law of War and America’s War on Terrorism,” International Journal on 
World Peace XXV No. 3 (September 2008):100-101. 
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of government, and the call for the application of the rule of law, both domestically and 
internationally.  
A framework of analysis has been constructed by dissecting the military commissions, political 
situations, international law, and the standing Supreme Court ruling regarding the rights of 
detainees to pursue habeas corpus. Then the detainee’s status, in regards to evidence collected, 
has been summarized to place them into one of three groups. Overlapping these two parts, we 
can derive policy recommendations that include: 
-Ending the military commissions  
-Pursuing more cases in the federal court system 
-Releasing those who are not to be tried 
-Imprisoning those convicted of terrorist attacks  
-Developing a plan to address future terrorist prosecution and imprisonment 
The overwhelming issue in closing Guantanamo Bay is really a matter of moral and ethical 
fortitude. Time and again, the US government has been given a chance to readily apply the rule 
of law and grant the detainees basic human rights guaranteed both through the US Constitution 
and the Geneva Conventions, among other international laws. 
 It was abhorrent to hear the Bush Administration speak of idealistic concepts such as freedom 
and democracy, while it continued to detain innocent men for years, using unsubstantiated 
national security fears as justification. It is equally abhorrent to hear the Obama Administration 
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speak of resurrecting the same military commissions that denied these men their ability to seek 
recourse in a court of law.  
What is needed is not a new system of laws, or rules, or processes, but men and women of 
government willing to implement the existing the rule of law, regardless of the potential 
repercussions. If there needs to be a new system of addressing a new classification of combatant, 
such as terrorist, then it needs to be built using existing principles of law, with their original 
intent intact. Distorting existing holes between domestic and international law (or creating new 
definitions arbitrarily) hurts the rule of law, the legitimacy of the government, and especially 
those that suffer under these new ‘ad hoc’ legal regimes. The conditions of prosecution and 
defense under the laws of war are changing; it is an appropriate time for the United States to 
honor the laws and treaties it has signed by pursuing a legal framework that can address these 
changes.  
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